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Abstract—On-line privacy is of major public concern.
Unfortunately, for the average consumer, there is no simple
mechanism to browse the Internet privately on multiple
devices. Most available Internet privacy mechanisms are
either expensive, not readily available, untrusted, or simply
provide trivial information masking. We propose that the
simplest, most effective and inexpensive way of gaining
privacy, without sacrificing unnecessary amounts of func-
tionality and speed, is to mask the user’s IP address while
also encrypting all data. We hypothesized that the Tor
protocol is aptly suited to address these needs. With this
in mind we implemented a Tor router using a single board
computer and the open-source Tor protocol code. We found
that our proposed solution was able to meet five of our
six goals soon after its implementation: cost effectiveness,
immediacy of privacy, simplicity of use, ease of execution,
and unimpaired functionality. Our final criterion of speed
was sacrificed for greater privacy but it did not fall so
low as to impair day-to-day functionality. With a total
cost of roughly $100.00 USD and a speed cap of around
2 Megabits per second we were able to meet our goal of
an affordable, convenient, and usable solution to increased
on-line privacy for the average consumer.
Index Terms—Computer Security, Tor Protocol, Net-
working, Consumer Electronics, Internet, Privacy, Cyber-
security, Single-board Computers
I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more data is generated, tracked,
collected, bought, and sold, an individual’s on-
line privacy becomes more and more important.
Although the data payload of any given transmission
will be (or should be) encrypted, the header file
which is used to route the data to its destination is
not. This allows an intermediary to scan and track a
users data packet from source to destination easily
and can compromise the users privacy by revealing
information such as the IP address of the user, desti-
nation IP address (which can clue the intermediary
in on what the user is doing while on-line), and
time of use (which gives the intermediary an idea
of when the user gets on-line on a given day). We
decided to see how feasible it would be to apply an
extra layer of privacy (without sacrificing so much
speed as to impede normal on-line operations) to
daily Internet activities; revealing the Tor protocol
as a possible solution. We wish to determine the
practicality of a Tor router in an attempt to provide
the average user a little more peace of mind. Tor
routing provides an extra layer of security while
browsing the Internet by masking a packet’s path
through Onion Routing, a routing protocol encap-
sulating data in layers of encryption. This protects
the user from attackers as well as taking away an
ISP’s ability to gather and sell a user’s browsing
data. The purpose of our project was to build a Tor
router, conduct speed test comparisons, and research
possible vulnerabilities which would lead to loss of
privacy. We specifically focused on a Tor router, as
opposed to the Tor browser, due to its portability
and versatility across multiple kinds if devices. In
order to paint a broader picture of the functionality
of such a device, we will also discuss how a Tor
router may be used by the average user to increase
privacy and why people should consider adopting
this technology.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Work Regarding Tor Networks
The Tor Project deals with increasing the level
of privacy afforded to a user [1][2] and designing
new versions of the Tor protocol that the network
uses [3][4]. The hope is to increase overall through-
put and speed as well as eliminate DNS leaks
and other potential privacy leaks through the use
of advanced data mining[5]. Other work includes
researching how the Tor network is being used,
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2how it impacts the user’s experience, and how it
impacts the Internet. A 2016 study by Andrea Forte,
Nazanin Andalibi and Rachel Greenstadt [6] sought
to understand how websites that block Tor users
affect the on-line experiences of those that wish
to maintain their privacy but also contribute to
the on-line knowledge pool, specifically Wikipedia.
Other more technical avenues of research include
the work done by the maintainers of Tonga, the
Tor network’s Bridge Authority, which endeavors
to reduce limitations in current implementations of
the Tor code. Although of great importance, such
research is unconcerned with Tor’s viability as a
consumer related Internet privacy system.
B. The Tor Protocol
Tor is built off of a protocol called Onion Routing
which was created by DARPA and patented by the
US Navy in 1998 [7]. The name is derived from the
use of multiple encryption layers applied to a packet
when sending from a source to a destination node.
(Figure 1 depicts a packet constructed by a user
who is using onion routing.) The prime directive of
onion routing and the Tor network is to hide as much
information about a user and their data as possi-
ble from each interconnected communication node.
Connection set up begins when the sender’s Tor
client (originator) asks a directory server (directory
node) for a list of Tor nodes. It then proceeds to pick
a path (chain) through the Tor nodes to the receiver’s
node (exit node). The originator then asks the direc-
tory node for a public key, which is generated using
asymmetric key cryptography. Using this key, the
user’s Tor client can begin a encrypted connection
to the first node (entry node) which will initiate an
encrypted connection to the second node, and so on
down the chain (a shared session key ensures that
the connection is authentic). The message to be sent
from a node X is then encrypted by the originator,
such that only node X + 1 can decrypt it (e.g. if
the path length is four nodes, then the innermost
encryption layer will be decipherable only by node
four, while the next layer up is decipherable only by
node three, and so on) [8]. Additionally, even though
each added node technically extends the originator’s
encrypted connection, each node along the chain
does not know anything about the previous or next
node except that they are the ”previous” and ”next”
nodes. This form of ”hopping” from node to node,
with each node knowing nothing about the overall
chain, ensures that the path of a packet cannot be
discerned by an outside party[9].
Fig. 1. A Depiction of Onion Routing[10].
Although, during transit, the packet is hidden,
weaknesses remain at the entry and exit nodes [11].
This is due to the fact that both the entry and exit
nodes are aware of their location in the chain and
are the only nodes which are connected to non-
Tor networks. The chance of gaining any informa-
tion from a compromised entry node is minimal
due to the multiple layers of encryption that are
applied to the packet. However, that does mean
that an intermediary could capture other seemingly
less sensitive information, such as the size of a
packet being sent or the fact that a user is using
the Tor protocol. This could give the intermediary
a clue as to what is going on (consider oppres-
sive governments that block all Tor network entry
nodes). However, the information gathered is far
less than what could normally be captured while
not using the Tor protocol. Regardless, some usable
data is still left out in the open. This has led to a
hidden system of Tor entry nodes allowing users to
connect to the Tor network without the attacker’s
foreknowledge. While the entry node does not pose
a significant threat of privacy leaks, the exit node
is an altogether different story. At the exit node, all
encryption afforded by onion routing ends and what
comes out of the exit node is readable plain-text.
This is catastrophic as it not only lets anyone see
the packet’s contents, but it also makes known the
packet’s final destination, whether innocent or illicit.
However, the true source remains obscured. Luckily,
this weakness can be minimized by using end-to-end
3encryption (such as using HTTPS vs HTTP) [9].
III. USING TOR FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY
In this work, the primary objective is to explore
a privacy solution for the general user or consumer
that is both feasible and functional. In creating
a small form-factor Wi-Fi router that routes all
traffic through the Tor network, this work enables
a portable and easy way to obscure user data while
connecting devices to the Internet. The device is
compact and can utilize either Ethernet or Wi-
Fi to connect to a network. The router provides
all services that a normal router would, including
DNS, DHCP, and NAT. Although, there are a few
drawbacks, the Tor router provides a compromise
between efficiency and security. In order to validate
the use of a Tor-enabled router, efficiency was
measured by evaluating the impact on download
speeds, security was measured by performing a
DNS leak test. Implementation and test methodol-
ogy are found in the following sections.
A. Implementation
The set-top Tor router was implemented using a
Raspberry Pi 3 running Raspbian OS. The assem-
bled Raspberry Pi was then housed within a plastic
casing for protection. The Raspian Stretch Lite OS,
which does not include a desktop environment, was
selected in order to maximize performance and
speed of the Tor Router. Subsequently, the Rasp-
berry Pi was configured to act as a normal router
to perform all standard routing tasks. The Raspberry
Pi’s internal Wi-Fi card was then configured to con-
nect to the local network. Additionally, an externally
connected Wi-Fi dongle was then configured an
to broadcast an SSID, and act as an access point
which was encrypted via WPA/WPA2. With the set-
top router able to accept connections from hosts, a
local DHCP server was enabled on the device to
handle assigning IP addresses to connected hosts.
Finally, DNS services were provided by using a
Google Public DNS Server. At this point, the set-top
Raspberry Pi was a fully functioning router with one
important difference; whereas, most routers connect
using only Ethernet this router was also able to
connect via Wi-Fi. This makes it far more portable
than a standard router.
With a functional router in hand, the next main
objective was to force all packets to be routed
through the Tor network instead of directly to their
destination. In order to achieve this, Tor software
was installed on the Raspberry Pi and configured
to run automatically on startup. All of the routing
services occur on the Wi-Fi interface that accepts
incoming connections from hosts. The outgoing
interface is constantly connected to the Tor network.
This creates a situation where all packets that exit
the Pi , regardless of their original source, are
sent straight to the Tor network, providing on-line
privacy regardless of which application the user may
be running.
IV. RESULTS
A. Impact on Speed
In order to determine the impact on speed, mul-
tiple upload and download speed tests were per-
formed using the Tor box router - with and without a
Tor enabled connection. The results varied depend-
ing on the path through which packets were routed.
The greater the distance, the greater impact on the
speed. In general, upload speed seemed to vary
more than download speed which stayed between
0.5Mb/s and 2Mb/s with around 1Mb/s to 1.5Mb/s
being the most commonly seen download speed.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of download speeds
while using Tor (avg. 1.7 MB/s) while Figure 3
shows the distribution of download speeds without
use of Tor (avg. 8.3 MB/s). The same analysis was
performed for upload speeds with results shown
for Tor Upload and Non-Tor uploads in Figures
4 and 5 respectively. While at first glance these
values seem to contradict our axiom of maintaining
usability, they are, in reality, perfectly functional
and usable speeds. In addition to the formal speed
tests, while connected to the Tor network, we were
able to stream video at resolutions up to 720p as
well as reach and interact with various websites. All
of which are day-to-day activities an average user
might engage in. However, it was near impossible
to download large files or stream full high definition
video content.
This variance in speed is expected due to the
overhead of multiple encryptions and decryption as
well as the often very roundabout way in which
a packet is routed. Additionally, the overall speed
of the connection will invariably get throttled by
the slowest node in the chain, a problem that can
only be resolved by increasing throughput for all
4Tor servers. As is the case with many things, the
efficiency is reduced in an effort to increase security.
Fig. 2. Internet download speed (Mb/s) on Wi-Fi with Tor router.
Fig. 3. Internet download speed (Mb/s) on Wi-Fi without Tor router.
Fig. 4. Internet upload speed (Mb/s) on Wi-Fi with Tor router.
Fig. 5. Internet upload speed (Mb/s) on Wi-Fi without Tor router.
B. Domain Name Server (DNS) Queries
We also performed a DNS leak test in order
to verify that the Tor router was in fact handling
DNS queries properly. This is crucial to securing a
user’s browsing data. When an originator does not
use the Tor network’s DNS services to complete
DNS requests a DNS leak occurs. DNS leaks allow
for an outside party to observe the websites a user
has visited. When a user makes a DNS request
to find the IP address of a website they wish to
visit, they normally use their local DNS server,
which then may contact a root DNS server, followed
by a Top Level Domain server, followed by an
authoritative server. Each of the connections to these
servers can be eavesdropped on in order gain more
information a user’s on-line habits. By using the
regular DNS servers for website queries, a user
completely forgoes the Tor network’s encryption to
discover the IP address of a website they wish to
visit. While this shows nothing about what parts of
a website a user has visited, it does show where
they have been or where they want to go. Such
information can be used to profile a user. The DNS
leak test showed that our router was not leaking
DNS requests. Instead, it used the Tor network’s
DNS services to complete DNS requests.
V. LIMITATIONS
Onion routing adds layers of encryption and
security to a packet, allowing for anonymous packet
transmission. The entry relay passes to the middle
relay, which passes to the exit relay. Each one
only knows how to communicate with its direct
neighbors. Unencrypted text is sent out the exit
relay toward the final destination and one must
5take further steps to secure their privacy beyond
that point. Secret entry nodes exist to allow people
to connect to the Tor network where governments
and/or other entities have banned its use. Packets
can be sniffed before reaching the entry relay but
decrypting them is generally not a feasible task. Tor
also places minimal trust in each node. Therefore,
even if a node is compromised along the way, it is
highly unlikely the attacker will be able to determine
your real IP address.
While the router discussed in this work solves
some of the issues associated with using Tor, it also
introduces other problems. Everyone connected to
the router has not yet reached the Tor network and
all internal network traffic is visible. Additionally,
extra care must be taken to prevent compromise
of the router, otherwise any chance of privacy is
eliminated, unless one uses the Tor browser in
conjunction with the router. Use of the Tor browser
obscures endpoint identification and packet-sniffing
by others connected to the router.
In addition to the limitations of the Tor Router,
according to the Tor Project there are several com-
mon actions that may compromise an individual’s
privacy while on a Tor Network [12]. These ac-
tions are summarized into the following two broad
categories: system behavior and browsing behavior.
Examples of system-wide behavior that can impact
anonymity include using other programs on your
system and not using the Tor Browser. Each of
these behaviors leaks out user information that is not
necessarily related to browsing contents - but rather
fingerprints of a user’s system. Examples of brows-
ing specific behaviors include downloading torrents,
using browser plug-ins, and not using HTTPS. Each
of these behaviors mitigates and potentially circum-
vents the privacy afforded to a user while using a
Tor browser and router combination.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When used properly, our Tor router provides a
secure way for the average user to browse the
Internet. While there are some drawbacks, we have
shown that Tor does secure a user’s browsing data
well enough to shield the user from unwanted
observation. Furthermore, using the Tor router is
not a complex endeavor. A user simply connects
the router to the Internet via Ethernet or Wi-Fi,
then connects his or her device to the router using
Wi-Fi. At which point, the user can now browse
the web as they normally would. On the other
hand, setting up a new connection does require
a more advanced technical understanding of the
router code. However, this can be easily resolved
by creating a support program which would handle
all of the heavy lifting and optimize configurations
for the user. We also recommend using the Tor
Internet browser in tandem with the router, due to
the fact that it helps force the user into incorporating
safe browsing practices as well as further limiting
potential data leaks. However, this is not available
to all devices one may wish to secure.
The primary objective of this work was to explore
a privacy solution for the everyday consumer that
was cost feasible and effective. This was accom-
plished by building a Tor router out of a single
board computer using open source Tor code. The
router successfully hid the user’s information from
parties outside the barrier of the router, including the
ISP. This was essential to the project, as Internet
privacy has become a forefront concern. There is
always a comprise between efficiency and security;
the goal of this work was to provide a solution that
is both convenient and effective. The Tor router is
portable and can connect to the Internet through
both Wi-Fi and Ethernet. While this router did hide
a user’s information, it came at the price of reduced
connection speed. Based on our testing and speed
comparisons, users can expect connection speeds
that cap at around the 2 Mb/s mark. However, the
goal of this project was primarily to aid in the
securing of an average user’s data - this goal was
achieved. Using a Tor router is not a panacea for
on-line security, but rather a first line of defense;
We encourage readers to look for additional ways
to secure their browsing data.
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